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Racism: values as justification

Le Québec réel, Quebec as it is, is describable in part by its spirit of the times. We are distracted, overwhelmed, to the point that we read of or listen to descriptions of a better possible Quebec without noticing that what we take to be ideal turns out, on examination, to be awful, something we reject. The problem is that we fail to carry out the examination. The awfulness passes without notice, even for ourselves when it is we who communicate certain values and ideals for fellow Quebeckers to read and hear. Here’s an example—

In parallel with the B-T Commission hearings, ‘Le Devoir’ has asked readers to submit texts on their vision of an ideal, at least a better, Quebec. A recent contribution by a sociologist concludes– “ Je rêve d’un Québec interculturel dans lequel tous accepteraient qu’il y ait un socle commun de valeurs quasi incontournables: le français, la laïcité, l’égalité des sexes et l’acceptation selon laquelle ce n’est pas la route violente qui mène à une société désirable et émouvante”. What does a close reading of this inspiration tell us? It tells us that a Quebec raised up on this “pedestal of common values” is a society that is fully compatible with a bit of slavery and with stoning as a punishment of men and women who, for example, commit adultery. That these things must be done in French and by, through or under a government that in some way separates public power and religion does not interfere with their being done, as long as they are done in full disregard of gender. Nor is the prohibition of violence an obstacle. It is, yes, for an uprising of slaves which may entail violence, but the interdiction is not an impediment to the institution of slavery. St. Paul told Christian slave owners to treat their Christian slaves kindly and he told the latter to gracefully submit themselves to the will of their masters. It can be done as well through secular teaching.

Nor is the injunction against violence a protection against stoning in the given sense. An example shows this. If I lock up someone, say for five years, I would have committed a cruel, perhaps vicious, crime. When the State does the same after a trial we sometimes wonder if it’s long enough.

So, to repeat, a close reading of the text brings to light an unexpected and unpleasant surprise. Did the author intend what we read? It seems very improbable. We can suppose that, in addition to the four fundamental values he identified there are other unnamed fundamental values that we just know of, take for granted. These assumed background values block a society that allows slavery and stoning.

In fact the sociologist gives some evidence for this supposition. He does not claim that his four fundamentals are inescapably or imperatively fundamental; he claims they are “almost”, “nearly”, perhaps only “seemingly” or “not really” (quasi) inescapably basic. But since he fails to tell us under what conditions, in what circumstances, the four pillar values do not predominate, and since he fails to tell us what non-identified and assumed values may predominate, and in what situations they so do, it turns out he has not told us anything of interest at all. His message is that an ideal Quebec should have an unspecified number of unidentified basic common values in some assortment which includes the four named. We are not held to include among the unidentified ones great values we now hold, freedom of religion for example.

Is nullity the only conclusion? I think not. Whatever else can be said, the explicit choice for naming “laïcité”, gender equality and non-violence as the basic values must be read and understood in its present context which is, if you will bear the reminder, a mistrust and fear, when not hate, of Muslims. And why do we mistrust, fear and hate them?
Muslims believe, promote and practice exactly what are the opposites of these three pillar values (although many do it, everyone admits, in an often impeccable French).

It is remarkable, is it not, that the named fundamental values just happen to be the exact counterchecks to Islam’s fundamental faults (as we are taught them). The most important things we find most awful about Muslims clash with just the things we most value: separation of Church and State, gender equality and renunciation of violence. (They value Religion-State fusion, subservience of women, aggression and violence.) With this in mind, I suggest that the choice of just these pillar values has a special motivation. We get closer to this realisation when we describe the values in view according to how they are promoted: they are the values which define Quebec’s national identity.

No-one likes to admit being prejudiced, being a racist. When we expect, insist, Muslims change their ways, become ‘integrated’, we do so for the best of reasons. We give reasons because we are reasoning beings. Having reasons makes what we do reasonable. For reasons to do their work they have to be good ones. Values are good, by definition. Values are what we desire. We have some basic values here in Quebec, and these common ideals should, must, be shared by all who live here so that we may live in a harmonious society that maintains its identity. Defending and promoting common values is not racism. Thus reprehensible racism is clothed in virtue; it is suppressed as what it is and re-emerges as national identity, mutual respect and the like.

Am I suggesting then our sociologist is a racist albeit in disguise? No more than I suggested he is in favour of slavery or stoning. All we get from him is what he gave us to read. And what he gave us to read is widely indeterminate, indeterminable and high-minded. What he gave us to read also includes just and precisely the three (+ French) valued abstractions we have examined. That is fact for which he rightly must be held responsible. This fact opens up some possibilities. One is that, whatever the opinions of our sociologist about Muslims, there are unashamed racists who could not agree with him more.

Le Québec imaginaire? In the first place one that isn’t half asleep. In the second place one that tempers its national and social desires with a political morality worthy of the name and, speaking of Quebec, worthy of its name.

Richard Rothschild

393, Haut de la Chute

Rigaud, QC J0P 1P0

(450) 451-2207

richeroths@yahoo.ca

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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